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Governments globally are turning to technology to fight Covid-19, but experts fear the apps designed to counter the virus could bring serious problems of 
their own.
The UK, like many other countries, has set up a 
taskforce to build a contact-tracing app that identifies 
when a known Covid-19 carrier comes into contact with 
someone else. The app flags contact points and allows 
potentially newly infected patients to seek medical advice 
or to self-isolate. 
Singapore, for example, released its app in March and 
European countries are working on their own systems, due 
for release in the coming weeks, but all will face the same 
problems of balancing efficacy against the constraints of 
technology and privacy. 
According to Claudia Pagliari, director of global eHealth 
at the University of Edinburgh, the ethical dilemmas such 
apps bring are far from new, but she fears such concerns 
will be sidelined in the rush to release the contact tracers.
“For notifiable diseases that present a threat to others, 
consent and confidentiality can take second place to public 
health, and the privacy rights of individuals can take 
second place to the rights of those they may have infected,” 
she said. 
She warns: “The increasing role of technology 
companies in the era of Covid-19, along with branches of 
government outside healthcare, is shaping these trade-offs 
in new ways, as we begin to lose sight of who is controlling 
our information and choices.”
Although there is public support, in principle, for a UK 
contact-tracing app (65% approval, according to Ipsos 
Mori), the government is having to finely balance its desire 
for more data about our symptoms, contacts and location, 
against the risk of public anxiety over state surveillance.
Against this backdrop, the unlikely couple of Apple and 
Google have teamed up to present a solution based on 
Bluetooth beacons embedded in mobile phones. Although 
it’s similar to other Contact Tracing Frameworks (CTFs) 
proposed by academic and industry consortia, the Apple/ 
Google approach is emerging as the frontrunner.  
The system enables cryptic anonymised codes to be 
exchanged between phones in close proximity, to create a 
record of contacts without the need for centralised 
tracking. “Their tech includes no location data, keeps 
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If trackers and apps are optional, as currently 
legislated in the UK, how many people download 
them remains to be seen. Much will depend on the 
level of trust officials can build in the service.
On top of the Apple/Google project, the 
government is exploring how to link these tools to 
sources of identifiable data, such as electronic 
medical records, to allow researchers to study the 
effects of factors such as geography, existing 
health conditions or ethnicity on outcomes. 
However, this risks breaching the public trust 
that’s critical to such a scheme’s success.
“These secondary uses may have value, but it’s 
incumbent upon the government to be honest with 
the public about the aims of all this data gathering, 
and who else stands to benefit, such as companies 
or researchers with a stake in the systems or 
analytics,” said Claudia Pagliari.
While the NHS is a trusted body, concerns have 
been raised about some of the companies the UK 
government has chosen to partner with 
during the crisis, in particular Palantir.
In the announcement about the 
taskforce, health officials explained that 
Palantir Technologies UK was providing 
software that “enables disparate data to 
be integrated, cleaned, and harmonised in 
order to develop the single source of truth 
that will support decision-making”. 
Assurances have been given that Palantir is 
“not a data controller, and cannot pass on or use 
the data for any wider purpose without the 
permission of NHS England”.
But people who have followed Palantir’s work 
for the US’s immigration enforcement agency may 
be more cautious. “When Palantir’s involvement 
was announced, it was framed like a benign data 
plumber to help with the coronavirus effort,” said 
Pagliari. “But they are actually data miners, and 
their main business lies in the crime/security/
forensics sector, with many government contracts 
for policing and anti-terrorism activities.” 
According to Pagliari, the firm’s involvement 
implies the possibility of stricter electronic 
measures being imposed if the crisis deepens. 
“The appearance of Palantir and similar firms in 
the coronavirus effort hints at preparations for 
more extreme forms of surveillance and control, 
should the public rebel against social distancing or 
if mass infection breaks out,” she said. “Hopefully, 
with the flattening of the curve, any such 
ambitions will be shelved.”
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points as a proxy 
for infection, but 
doing so uses huge 
assumptions, so 
there could be 
huge amounts of 
dirty or plain false 
information.” 
Even if apps can 
be coded to work 
around this issue, 
the vast array of 
hardware could 
also impact the 
quality of results. 
In the same way 
that mobile phone 
models display 
different signal strengths in the same location, Bluetooth 
reception also varies.
“It’s one thing to say ‘beacons allow you to infer a range 
down to 2m’, it’s completely another thing when you run 
that protocol across different hardware platforms,” said 
Booth. “How do you know the algorithm you’re running 
when broadcast to an iPhone 6 is going to deliver exactly 
the same range proximity measurement as when it’s 
broadcast into a Samsung?  
“It’s not a simple case of code, this is about chipsets and 
performance of hundreds of different devices and versions 
of devices and chipsets.” 
Mixed measurements are further complicated by 
environmental factors. For example, a Bluetooth beacon 
won’t distinguish whether someone is wearing a mask, or 
is even in the same room as the carrier, because the radio 
waves pass through walls. Anderson suggests that a way 
to improve the quality of the data 
would be to use an app to “involve 
each user, presenting them with a 
list of possible significant contacts 
(whatever the criterion for that is, 
say, within 2m for five minutes) 
and let them delete those that are 
not relevant, perhaps for people in 
other rooms.”
However, a system that relies on 
users to confirm contact with infected patients also runs 
the risk of people falsely reporting so that they can 
continue working or avoid self-isolation. 
A more fundamental problem for the feasibility of 
contact-tracing technology is the absence of reliable data 
on who is carrying the disease. “Consider how few people 
are actually being tested, compared with the many 
thousands likely to be affected,” said Pagliari. “Given the 
scarcity of lab tests up until now, most of those confirmed 
positive for Covid-19 are serious cases admitted to hospital, 
which begs the question: who’s contacts are you going to 
trace?” she added. “Without knowing who’s infected in the 
first place, expecting everybody to install these trackers on 
their phones makes little sense unless you have other uses 
in mind.” 
everything on your phone unless you’re a part of a reported 
infection, [and] protects personal anonymity via a random 
ID issued to you every day,” said Craig Danuloff, CEO of 
privacy software firm The Privacy Company in a blog post.
“What they’re proposing is less privacy-invasive than 
using maps. It’s less privacy-invasive than having a 
Facebook account. It’s purpose-driven, narrowly focused, 
privacy-centric, and will exist only while we need it.”
Even long-standing privacy advocates argue that 
compromises have to be made when dealing with 
situations such as Covid-19. “The expectation of privacy 
around tracing contacts of someone who’s got a notifiable 
disease is very much less [than normal],” Ross Anderson, 
professor of security engineering at the Department of 
Computer Science and Technology, University of 
Cambridge, told PC Pro. “It’s a mistake to conflate this 
with online anonymity.
“A doctor who diagnoses you must inform the public 
health authorities, and if they have the bandwidth, they 
call you and ask who you’ve been in contact with. They 
then call your contacts in turn,” he said. 
 Is Bluetooth up to the job?
While Bluetooth solutions might please privacy 
watchdogs, experts have pointed to limitations in the 
underpinning technology, which was initially developed 
for the advertising industry.
For a start, researchers believe as many as two billion 
handsets globally can’t use the low-power Bluetooth 
beacons that drive the Apple/Google project because older 
handsets don’t support the technology, immediately 
hampering a system that needs to reach a critical mass of 
users to be effective. 
There are further concerns about accuracy. “When 
Bluetooth low-energy beacons were designed, it was 
binary: ‘Can you see the device or not?’” said Phil Booth, 
coordinator of health rights group medConfidential. 
“They’re now trying to go to a completely different level 
of sophistication to determine what distance you are from 
the beacon.
“The basic concept of what they are trying to do is infer 
a distance and measure a time and combine those two data 
This is about chipsets 
and performance of 
hundreds of different 
devices and versions of 
devices and chipsets 
ABOVE  Without 
widespread testing, 
many carriers will 
be left untraced
14 May 2020, Issue 308
Shared with the editor's permission. For more articles go to subscribe.pcpro.co.uk
